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C
ORPORATISM refers to various types of institutional arrangements whereby important political-economic decisions are reached via negotiation between, or in consultation with, peak-level representatives of employees and/or employers, sometimes involving other interest groups and the state. One of the best-known forms of corporatism is centralized wage-setting, in which wages for a large portion of the work force are bargained by national union and employer confederations. A second important form is participation by such confederations in the formation of government decisions about nonwage issues such as fiscal policy, monetary policy, active labor market policy, and so on. Corporatist arrangements have been among the key political-economic institutions in a number of affluent capitalist nations since the 1960s. They have thus been of substantial interest to macro-comparative sociologists, political scientists, and economists.ployment is one of the most important economic outcomes in affluent countries. It is a major contributor to individual unhappiness (Clark and Oswald 1994) and to societal ills such as poverty, neighborhood decay, and crime (Chiricos 1987; Wilson 1996) ; it also impedes economic growth (Okun 1973) and is a potential threat to the welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1999). Large-scale unemployment has arguably been the prime economic, social, and political issue in much of Western Europe over the past two decades.
I attempt to answer three questions that reflect notable gaps in previous research linking corporatism with low unemployment: (1) Are corporatism's effects on unemployment generated by both corporatist wage-setting and union participation in economic policymaking, or by only one of these forms of corporatism? (2) What are the causal mechanisms through which such effects occur? (3) Did these effects continue in the 1990s in the face of globalization, restrictive monetary policy, growing dissension within labor movements, and related developments?
THREE QUESTIONS WHICH FORM OF CORPORATISM?
The focus of most research on corporatism's macroeconomic effects has been on wagesetting arrangements. Yet some scholars view corporatism as participation by organized interest groups in various types of public policymaking. This conception, originally highlighted by Lehmbruch (1984) No prior study has examined the macroeconomic impact of these two principal forms of corporatism in conjunction. Analyses of corporatist wage-setting have not controlled for union participation in policymaking, and vice-versa. These two forms are likely to be correlated with one another, raising the possibility that at least some of the existing research has mistakenly emphasized the wrong form of corporatism.
WHAT ARE THE CAUSAL MECHANISMS?
Among researchers interested in wage determination, the predominant notion has been that centralized or coordinated wage-setting yields low unemployment by engendering real wage restraint. (I use the term "wages" throughout as shorthand for wages plus benefits.) The general logic is relatively simple, although specific applications of it can be complex (Franzese 1999 ; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] 1997). If employees bargain aggressively for high wage increases and employers acquiesce, the latter can do five main things in response: raise productivity, raise prices, reduce profits paid out to investors, reduce investment, and/or reduce the number of employees. Where wages are bargained at a large number of separate firms or plants, each individual union may reasonably hope that its employer's response to a pay increase will consist predominantly of some combination of the first four options. None of these responses will necessarily have an adverse short-term effect on employment or inflation-adjusted wages, which are the principal concerns of union negotiators. Even if the firm chooses to reduce employment, those laid off should be able to find work elsewhere as long as the pattern of wage increases and layoffs is not generalized throughout the economy. Thus, where bargaining is decentralized and uncoordinated, there is an incentive for unions to pursue a strategy of wage militancy.
By contrast, if the wage negotiations cover a relatively large share of the work force, union bargainers can be reasonably sure that a large wage increase will have an adverse impact on their members. For instance, when an individual firm raises prices, this is likely to have little or no effect on the living standard of that firm's own employees (unless the company's goods or services happen to account for a large share of what those employees consume). But when firms representing a sizable share of the economy raise prices, the resulting inflation offsets or nullifies the wage gains of most workers. Similarly, a reduction in employment at a single CORPORATISM AND UNEMPLOYMENT 369 firm does not necessarily reduce the job prospects for workers who are laid off; but if wage increases and ensuing layoffs are economy-wide, employment opportunities will diminish. Centralized or coordinated wage-setting thus generates an incentive for wage moderation.
Wage moderation, in turn, is presumed to contribute to lower unemployment. The assumption is that slower growth of real labor costs (often referred to as "real unit labor costs") leads to lower unemployment. "Labor costs" refer to wages and benefits adjusted for productivity, and "real" denotes adjustment for inflation. If wage increases are offset by increases in productivity and/ or prices, then real labor costs have not increased. Consequently, there is no need for employers to reduce payments to investors, investment, or employment. However, if real labor costs do increase, one result-perhaps the main result-will be a higher unemployment rate as employers respond by reducing the size of their work force.
Some researchers have focused on the effects of wage-bargaining centralization, while others have emphasized wage coordination. Centralization refers to the level(s) peak, sectoral, company/plant-at which wages are determined. Coordination refers to the degree to which minor players in the wage-setting process (e.g., firm-or plantlevel bargainers) intentionally follow along with what the major players decide. Bargaining centralization is one means of achieving coordination. A second is state-imposed centralization, as in Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark in some years, and even Canada and the United States in a few years. A third is guidance of industry or firm-level bargaining by peak union and/or employer confederations, as in Switzerland, Austria (prior to the mid-1980s), Norway (in a number of years), the Netherlands (since 1983), and Italy (since 1993). This might be termed "informal centralization." In informal centralization, union and/or employer confederations tacitly centralize the bargaining process by suggesting and/or approving wage agreements that are formally negotiated at lower levels, or sometimes simply by sharing information and fostering a climate of consensus. A fourth means of achieving coordination is pattern-setting led by a powerful sector, as in Germany, or by a group of influential firms, as in Japan. Pattern-setting exists where bargaining is formally decentralized, but in practice one or a few wage settlements (e.g., the metalworkers' settlement in Germany) are seen by all or most other bargaining parties as determining the outcome that they will follow.
Centralization has received the bulk of attention in the corporatist literature. But to understand the effects of wage-setting institutions on labor cost developments and unemployment, it makes more sense to focus on wage coordination (Flanagan 1999 (1999) all found an association between corporatist wage-setting and real wage restraint. Because of limited data availability, however, these studies examined wages only in the manufacturing sector. Although manufacturing historically has been a pacesetter for wage developments in the rest of the economy, it has accounted for only one-fifth of total employment in most affluent countries in recent decades. Thus, it is important to examine wage patterns in other sectors as well. A recent OECD (1997) study used wage data for the entire economy and found no association between wage centralization or coordination and changes in real wages. That analysis, however, was based on a highly underspecified model. In addition, each of these previous studies focused on wages, despite the fact that the theory specifies a link with labor costs.1 I am not aware of any empirical assessments of the hypothesis that corporatismin the form of wage-setting and/or union participation in economic policymaking-affects unemployment via government policy. 1 Western and Healy's (1999) study was not aimed at examining the mechanism linking corporatism with low unemployment and so had no reason to consider labor costs. Kenworthy (1996) and Traxler and Kittel (2000) each found links between wage-setting and nominal labor cost restraint and between nominal labor cost restraint and low inflation. But neither study examined real labor costs, which are presumed to be the mechanism through which corporatism generates low unemployment. Boreham and Compston (1992) Existing research has been confined to the 1970s and 1980s. Did corporatist effects continue in the 1990S?2 There are five plausible scenarios.
(1) Corporatist effects weakened or disappeared-because corporatist institutions became less effective at generating low unemployment than in previous decades.3 First, coordinated wage-setting may have become less able to secure labor cost moderation, as wage drift at the firm-or plant-level increasingly offset the restraint generated in coordinated negotiations. The chief cause of this wage drift is thought to be dissension among different segments of the work force, particularly over the issue of relative pay levels (Ahlen 1989; Hernes 1991). One important division is among private-sector blue-collar, private-sector white-collar, and public-sector employees; another is among highly skilled versus semiskilled and unskilled employees.
A second reason why corporatist countries may have been less able to secure low unemployment in the 1990s is declining policy autonomy. Loose monetary policy is one way to stimulate the economy and thereby hold down the rate of joblessness, but various aspects of globalization encouraged policymakers in most affluent nations to pursue a restrictive monetary policy in the 1990s (Boix 2000; Scharpf and Schmidt 2000). In some countries, this reflected a desire to comply with the low-inflation requirement for European monetary integration. In all nations it is partly a product of heightened financial globalization-in particular, the growing importance of currency speculators in determining currency values. By the mid-1990s, more than $1 trillion in currencies was traded each day, much of it by speculators using low inflation as their principal criterion for selecting currencies in which to invest (Woodall 1995:10) . Massive currency sell-offs provoked by even moderate inflation-or expected inflation, as gauged by low domestic interest rates and/or sizable government deficits-are embarrassing to government officials and potentially highly destabilizing (Krugman 1998) . Convergence in monetary policy removed one important tool that governments in corporatist countries may have formerly used to influence the unemployment rate. In addition, the heightened ease of capital exit may have pressured policymakers in corporatist countries to cut back on other programs for reducing unemployment, such as education, active labor market policy, and public employment.
(2) Corporatist effects weakened or disappeared-because noncorporatist institutions became more effective at generating low unemployment than in previous decades. Growing international trade and heightened integration of financial markets have increased the competitive pressures faced by many firms and also enhanced companies' ability to move to other countries. These developments have increased employers' motivation to demand labor cost moderation as well as their leverage vis-a-vis employees. Hence, labor cost restraint may have become more common in countries with fragmented wagesetting institutions, eroding the difference between low-coordination and high-coordination countries (Streeck 1984; Windolf 1989) . In this view, corporatism's effects disappear in the 1990s because low-coordination countries are increasingly able to restrain labor costs and hence can achieve the low levels of unemployment formerly confined to high-coordination countries.
(3) Corporatist effects persisted. Many observers have expressed skepticism about the degree to which globalization has altered 2 A few studies, such as Iversen (1999), Nickell and Layard (1999) , and Western (2001), included the early 1990s but did not examine the possibility of changes in effects during these years.
3 A decline in wage coordination's prominence can be misinterpreted as a decline in its effectiveness. Wage coordination decreased in Sweden and Australia in the 1990s. If these countries were less successful at securing wage restraint and low unemployment in the 1990s than they formerly had been, that might be due to the reduction in wage coordination's prominence rather than to a reduction in its effectiveness. (4) Corporatist effects increased-because corporatist institutions became even more effective at generating low unemployment than in previous decades. With monetary policy lost as a policy tool, union wage negotiators interested in political exchange or union representatives directly involved in economic policymaking may have turned their attention to active labor market policy, government employment, or other programs aimed at reducing joblessness. To the extent that these programs succeeded, the unemployment gap between corporatist and noncorporatist countries might have widened in the 1990s.
(5) Corporatist effects increased-because noncorporatist institutions became even less effective at generating low unemployment than in previous decades. With all nations committed to a tight money orientation, "excessive" increases in labor costs may have been even more likely in the 1990s to result in higher unemployment because governments were increasingly unable to "monetize" such labor cost increases (i.e., to allow higher inflation in order to prevent a rise in unemployment). Thus, if fragmented wage-setting continued to promote wage militancy, the unemployment performance of noncorporatist countries may have worsened in the 1990s.
METHOD, DATA, AND VARIABLES
I use pooled time-series cross-section regressions to explore the effects of wage coordination and union participation in economic policymaking on unemployment over the period 1980 to 1997. Sixteen affluent OECD countries are included: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Data for unemployment and many of the independent variables are available through 1999, but because of data limitations for the union participation variable the analysis covers only the period through 1997. All variables are described in Table 1 .
Some scholars suggest that the employed share of the working-age population is a more telling indicator of labor market performance than the unemployment rate (Scharpf 1999:125-26; Smith 1999). Unemployment, after all, can be "hidden" by low levels of labor force participation (as in Italy, Belgium, and Ireland) or by various active labor market, early retirement, and other social-welfare policies (as in Sweden). Yet using the employment rate as an indicator of labor market outcomes is not without problems, particularly because nations differ in the frequency with which women, especially married women, participate in the paid labor force. This variation, which is a result of differing cultural traditions and government policies, yields sizable cross-country differences in employment rates that have little or nothing to do with the health of the labor market. Therefore, despite its limitations, unemployment remains a preferable indicator (also see Nickell 1997). As it turns out, the causal patterns are similar for these two measures of labor market performance. (These and other results not shown here are available from the author on request.)
The wage-coordination variable is my own (Kenworthy 2001a) . It is an index ranging from 1 to 5. This is the only existing coordination variable that is measured annually and provides scores through the late 1990s. Unlike other coordination indicatorsSoskice (1990), Layard et al. (1991) , OECD (1997), Hall and Franzese (1998)-it does not attempt to capture the degree of actual wage coordination in each country. It is extremely difficult to measure the degree to which the various actors involved in the wage-setting process deliberately harmonize their bargaining. To do so, the researcher must factor in both the share of the work force whose wages are deliberately pegged to the agreements) reached by the major player(s) and the degree to which minor players follow along (how closely they adhere). This information is not easily discernible, much less readily available. Existing measures thus tend to be highly impression- Table 2 shows the regression results for the two corporatism indicators plus the control variables and the lagged unemployment rate. The results suggest a negative effect of wage coordination on unemployment.8
Model 2 adds the wage coordination x period interaction term (and a similar interaction for union participation in policymaking x period, discussed below). In regressions searching for a break in effects using all possible periodizations, the t-value for the interaction term and the R-squares for the equation are largest in the regression using 1992 as the break point. I therefore use this periodization in the Model 2 regression. The results indicate that wage coordination reduced unemployment between 1980 and 1991, but not thereafter. In the 1992-1997 period there is no effect, as the coefficient for the wage-coordination variable (which estimates the effect for 1980-1991) almost 6 The null hypothesis of nonstationarity for the Im-Pesaran-Shin test (see Im, Pesaran, and Shin 1997) was rejected at the p < .001 level. Note that these regressions assess change in unemployment outcomes, as they include the lagged unemployment rate as a regressor. If the lagged dependent variable is dropped, the wage-coordination variable is negatively signed and easily statistically significant in the 1992-1997 regression (not shown). In other words, controlling for other relevant determinants, countries with greater wage coordination continued to enjoy lower unemployment rates in the 1990s. However, the Table 2 results, with the lagged unemployment rate included, suggest that this was a legacy of superior performance in earlier decades. Table 2 includes results of two sets of robustness tests for the 1980-1991 and 1992-1997 regressions. The first test drops each country one at a time ("jackknife"). Outliers may be of particular concern for the 1990s: Finland experienced a deep economic shock 9 I also explored this issue using period averages for the two decades instead of annual observations. The data were pooled (yielding 32 observations) and a wage coordination x 1990s period interaction term entered in the regression. As with the regressions using yearly data, the wage-coordination variable is negatively signed and statistically significant, while the wage coordination x 1990s interaction term is positively signed and also significant. Results for the other variables are generally consistent with those in Table 2. due to the sudden collapse of the Soviet market, Germany took on the burden of unification, Norway benefited from substantial oil revenues, the United States lowered its unemployment rate in part by incarcerating a larger share of its unskilled males, and so on (Smith 1999; Western and Beckett 1999). The second test reestimates the regressions with all possible combinations of the control variables ("extreme bounds"). Both tests suggest that the results for the wage-coordination variable are reasonably robust.
What accounts for this shift in the relationship between wage coordination and unemployment? Figure 1 indicates that, aside from Finland and Sweden, countries with coordinated wage-setting generally did not perform worse in the 1990s than in the 1980s. Indeed, several high-coordination countries, such as the Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark, experienced markedly better unemployment performance in the 1990s than in the previous decade. Instead, the difference between the two periods is attributable mainly to the fact that low-coordination countries-Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States-improved their performance.10
To understand why the impact of wage coordination disappeared in the 1990s, we need to know the mechanisms) through which wage coordination affected joblessness in the 1980s. If the effect of wage coordination on unemployment worked through labor cost moderation, economic growth, and/or government policies, entering these variables into the 1980s regression should reduce the size of the coefficient for the wage-coordination variable. Table 3 shows the results of doing this. They suggest some support for the conventional notion that the 10 It is worth emphasizing the substantial cross-country variation in unemployment performance evident in Figure 1 . In the 1980s, there was virtually no increase in joblessness relative to 1974-1979 in Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, and the United States, whereas in the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Ireland, and the United Kingdom the unemployment rate rose by more than four percentage points. In the 1990s, the spread was even more pronounced, with several countries achieving reductions of two percentage points or better while others experienced increases of four percentage points or more. It is therefore useful to separately examine the effect of wage coordination on labor costs and the effect of labor costs on unemployment. This also makes it possible to explore whether coordination's lack of association with low unemployment in the 1990s was due to wage coordination no longer being associated with labor cost moderation or to labor cost moderation no longer being associated with low unemployment (or both). Table 4 shows the results of two regressions. In Model 1, the real labor cost index is regressed on lagged labor costs, wage coordination, a wage coordination x period dummy interaction, unemployment (average of t, t-1, and t-2), and three additional variables that have proved relevant in prior research on determinants of wage developments: inflation, trade, and union density ( The United Kingdom and Denmark are more likely candidates. Both suffered a sharp rise in unemployment in the early 1980s, just as they shifted toward less coordinated wage-setting. But did wage militancy generated by wage coordination in earlier years cause these increases in jobless- What about reverse causality in the 1990s? The regression results suggest that the association between wage coordination and low unemployment eroded in that decade, but might that be because high or rising levels of joblessness spurred an increase in wage coordination in some countries? Two nations-Ireland and Italy-shifted from low to high coordination in the 1990s (see Figure 1) , and in both countries the aim was to restrain wages and thereby reduce unemployment. However, Ireland was quite successful at lowering unemployment in 1990s, while Italy did not fare particularly well. Hence, these two cases probably offset one another, so that the regression results were unaffected. The jackknife analyses indicate that removing either or both does not alter the findings.
Is the finding of no association between wage coordination and unemployment performance in the 1990s a result of a misspecification of the functional form of the relationship? Calmfors and Driffill (1988) and others have posited a hump-shaped relationship between wage-bargaining centralization and labor cost changes, whereby low and high levels of centralization are best at Hall and Franzese 1998; Iversen 1999). In auxiliary regressions not shown here I tested each of these alternative specifications. None is supported. Do the regression analyses suggest no effect of wage coordination in the 1990s because of multicollinearity? The two corporatism variables correlate at .66 in that decade, compared with .41 in the 1980s. However, the findings for wage coordination are robust to exclusion of the union participation variable, as is indicated by the figures at the bottom of Model 4 in Table 2 .
Unemployment dropped sharply in Sweden and several other countries in the late 1990s. Perhaps the fact that the analyses here extend only to 1997 is responsible for the apparent lack of association between wage coordination and unemployment performance in the 1990s. However, a reestimation of the regression in Model 4 of Table 2 (not shown) adding the years 1998 and 1999 and dropping the union participation variable (due to lack of data) suggests not. The wagecoordination variable in this regression is positive, although not statistically significant.
The second hypothesized causal link between wage coordination and unemployment is economic growth. The regressions indicate some support for this mechanism: When the real GDP index is added to the 1980s regression, the wage-coordination coefficient decreases somewhat, though not a great deal (Model 3 in Table 3 ).
What about the possibility that wage coordination lowers unemployment via government policy? The hypothesis here is that policymakers presume wage coordination will engender labor cost moderation, and hence that inflationary pressures will be minimal. This encourages governments to pursue more vigorous anti-unemployment programs. Entering the five policy variables one by one into the 1980s regression suggests that only education expenditures, active labor market policy, and government employment are likely channels linking wage coordination with low unemployment. Model 4 in Table 3 shows the result for the wage coordination coefficient when these three policy variables are added to the Table  2 
UNION PARTICIPATION IN ECONOMIC POLICYMAKING
For union participation in economic policymaking, the second form of corporatism examined here, the story is different. The regression results in Table 2 suggest that, conditional on the presence of a leftist government, union participation tended to be associated with lower unemployment in both the 1980s and the 1990s. The estimates in Model 2 indicate that this effect grew stronger be-
